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EFT Archive (Research Alert Group)...

Cubans Indignant over Stiff Sentences for Convicted Spies

The Tale of the Five Cuban Spies

Fidel Castro gives a speach in front of photos of the five convicted Cuban spies
Cuban President Fidel Castro speaks in front of pictures of five men convicted of spying in the United States in Havana, June 23, 2001 (Photo: AFP).

It's 2002 in Cuba, otherwise known as "The Year of the Heroes Held Prisoner by the Empire." That is, at least, according to the free wall calendar that came with the Jan. 1 edition of the Cuban government's daily newspaper Granma.
Not since the demonstrations it organized on behalf of young shipwreck survivor Elián González has the Cuban government embarked on such a highly choreographed, energetic public opinion campaign.
"The Five Patriotic Heroes," as the Cuban press refers to them, are a group of Cuban agents recently convicted in the United States for spearheading a spy ring known as "The Wasp Network." Their six-month trial in a Miami federal courtroom resulted in prison sentences that many Cubans feel were unjustified and excessively severe. Three of the five agents—Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino, and Antonio Guerrero—were sentenced to life in prison; two others, Fernando González and René González [no relation], received 19 and 15 years, respectively.
The five Cuban agents were allegedly sent in the mid-1990s to infiltrate U.S.-based Cuban exile groups. By pretending to be staunchly anti-Castro, the agents gained entry into organizations like Brothers to the Rescue and the Cuban-American National Foundation with the intention of gathering intelligence about possible terrorist attacks against Cuba. The prosecution claimed that the agents also unsuccessfully sought to obtain information about a Navy base in the Florida Keys. They were ultimately convicted on charges of espionage conspiracy and operating as unregistered foreign agents. U.S. District Judge Joan Lenard sentenced each of the spies based on the extent of their involvement.

Cubans protest detention of spies
Havana residents demonstrate in support of the detained Cuban agents in December, 2001 (Photo: AFP).
"Maybe if they were from another country they would have just been deported," said Gustavo Reynoso, a 45-year-old produce vendor, "But not in this case, not with Cuba."
Cuban officials have attacked the trial's legitimacy all along. Just after the trial's conclusion, Cuba's National Assembly met in a special session on Dec. 29 to honor the convicted agents.
"The political battle has just begun," announced President Fidel Castro at the meeting, before reiterating a promise he's made publicly since the trials began: "They will return." The Assembly unanimously voted to designate the five as "heroes of the Cuban Republic," and declared that the year 2002 would be dedicated to their plight.
The spies' trial has been mirrored by months of fervid "free the five" rallies and an abundance of rousing news reports on government-owned television casting the convicted agents as chivalrous, self-sacrificing crusaders who had ventured "into the belly of the beast" to protect their country. Transcripts of the agents' dramatic courtroom speeches have appeared in Cuban newspapers and have been read aloud on Cuban TV repeatedly.
"What else could Cuba have done to defend itself against terrorist attacks? What else could it have done to avoid a greater conflict? What other options were there to protect its sovereignty and the security of its people?" Antonio Guerrero, one of the convicted spies, asked rhetorically in his closing statement. Guerrero, 43, is a U.S. citizen who was born in Miami.
Perhaps the most politically charged aspect of the trial was the conviction of the network's supposed ringleader, Gerardo Hernández, on charges of conspiracy to murder. The court found that Hernández played a role in the 1997 downing of two Brothers to the Rescue planes by the Cuban Air Force, in which four people died. Cuba insists that the planes were shot down after repeatedly making unauthorized incursions into Cuban airspace, and that both the Cuban and U.S. governments had reprimanded the pilots repeatedly for dropping anti-Castro leaflets over Havana during the preceding weeks.
According to the prosecution, Hernández knew of the Cuban Air Force's plans to attack the planes, as evidenced in his warning to other Brothers pilots not to fly that day. "Four lives were unlawfully extinguished due to the conspiracy the defendant joined, and the value of those lives must be affirmed in the sanction applied to him . . . the prescribed life sentence," wrote federal prosecutor Caroline Miller in the court filings. Hernandez admitted to informing Cuban authorities of Brothers flight plans, but denied any knowledge of plans to shoot down the planes. He received two concurrent life sentences.
Many Cubans on the streets of Havana, however, were quick to defend the agents' deeds. "They went to protect the Cuban people against terrorism, and the American people as well. It has nothing to do with politics," said Elsa Alvarez, a 48-year-old florist.
But whether one stands north or south of Florida Straits, the trial of the five Cuban agents raises a number of important questions about the United States' relationship with anti-Castro militants, particularly in light of the new war on terrorism. The convicted Cuban spies frequently charged U.S. officials with continuing to distinguish between "good terrorists"—who support U.S. policies—and "bad terrorists"—who don't.
For years Cuba has accused U.S. authorities of turning a blind eye to the activities of violent anti-Castro exiles like Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles. Cuban officials accuse Bosch and Posada Carriles of masterminding, among other things, the 1976 bombing of a Cubana Airlines flight that killed 73 people. Bosch was first arrested in 1968 after he tried to attack a Cuba-bound Polish tanker with a bazooka. Posada Carriles is currently held in a Panamanian jail on charges of plotting to assassinate Castro at the 1999 PanAmerican summit. Havana claims both men have long-standing ties to both Cuban exile organizations and U.S. government officials.
When asked his opinion of the charges leveled against the Cuban agents, 65-year-old Roberto Pérez seems suddenly energized in the late afternoon heat. "Lying bastards!" he shouts in disgust, waving his arms in the air. The other old men seated around him on the ledge of an empty Havana supermarket simply nod their heads in agreement. S:worldpress.org
                                                                                                                     

The Cuban Spy Page

Introduction

Cuba, unlike Israel, is a hostile nation. It is considered in the same category of hostile nations as Libya, and Iraq. In spite of the status of Cuba as a hostile nation and in spite of the enormity of the crimes committed by the Cuban spies - including the murder of American civilians - the sentences currently being meted out to the Cuban spies are shockingly light. For example, Alejandro Alonso, one of the Cuban spies, was recently sentenced to only 7 years. Compare and contrast this to the life sentence without parole that Jonathan Pollard received for espionage on behalf of Israel - America's strong friend and close ally.
To better understand the seriousness of the Cuban Spy case, the following excerpt from the Congressional Record is an excellent primer. The speaker is Senator Jesse Helms:
Clinton Administration Must Respond Forcefully To Cuban Espionage

US versus Cuba - the big roundup: FBI arrest 10 spies

Fall 1998 - Marcelo Fernandez-Zayas - Guaracabuya/Friends of Peace  
INTRODUCTION
We are witnessing a case of espionage without precedent in the United States. Due to its complexity, magnitude and consequences for the present and the future, this case is expected to follow a long judicial process: both civil and criminal. This process probably will be longer than the tenure of the current Cuban government. We warn the reader that at this point it is impossible to reach definite conclusions on this case, because it is still developing, and what is known officially is about "one per cent of the case." What has been revealed up to now represents the minimum for the federal authorities to begin the judicial process against the 10 suspected spies in a court of law. Prosecutors have released just enough information to deny bail and keep the suspects behind bars.
This is a very preliminary analysis of a case that will involve known figures in US politics, in Cuba and several organizations of Cuban exiles. It is expected that this case will acquire importance and strength, by the end of January 1999, when a new session of Congress begins and more of the case is revealed. In the meantime, we should anticipate a political and propaganda offensive from Cuba to be launched at any time. As a consequence of what will be revealed, we should expect additional arrests of exiles or pro-Castro Cubans and other agents in the near future. The unfolding of the case and related crises that will develop will produce deep divisions among the followers of Castro, mainly in the Cuban armed forces. In Cuba, we may hear from former intelligence agents who were "purged" in 1989 after the arrest and jailing of the chief of the intelligence service, General Jose (Pepe) Abrahantes. These former agents are approaching dissidents in Cuba, blaming the present Chief of Intelligence for "improvised incompetence and of not having the balls to confront the madman."
It is expected that the number of US congressmen who oppose the present economic sanctions against Cuba will diminish as more details of this case are known. 

ACTION BEGINS
Saturday, September 12, 1998. In the afternoon of this day, Cuban-American congressmen Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz Balart received unexpected telephone calls. At the other end of the line was FBI Director Judge Louis Freeh, who informed them individually that FBI agents, following his orders, had arrested 10 people of Cuban origin in the Miami area, charging them with espionage. The 10 were presented to a federal magistrate, who after hearing the charges, ordered the accused to be provided with attorneys and remain in custody without bail. ( 1 ) 

ITEMS CONFISCATED FROM SUSPECTS
Monday, September 14, 1998. The FBI Office in Miami, Florida, published the names of the arrested persons and gave limited details about them. The office noted that eight men and two women were arrested early Saturday morning and charged with espionage. Among the items confiscated from them were lists of names of other implicated persons, personal computers, hundreds of computer diskettes, shortwave radios capable of transmission and reception, codes, photographic equipment, and maps of the cities of Miami, New York, Houston and Las Vegas. FBI agents also found documents identifying buildings of military bases belonging to the US Southern Command ( 2 ), lists containing the names, addresses and phone numbers of "hundreds" of civilian and military employees of all ranks of the Southern Command. Also confiscated were disguises and related paraphernalia such as wigs, hair dyes, and other cosmetic products. Among the communications equipment found in the possession of the suspects were automobiles, tape recorders, miniature microphones, two-way FM radios and portable short-wave radios for communication with foreign bases and distant satellites. ( 3 ) 

CIVILIAN AND MILITARY TARGETS
The group of 10 had clear military objectives, the penetration of the US Southern Command and the Boca Chica Air Base in Key West. To accomplish this operation, one of the 10 obtained civilian employment in a low-ranking job in the public works section of the base. This base has many buildings, runways, hangars, and military planes. In this place of employment, the agent could obtain names, addresses and telephone numbers of civilian and military personnel of the base. According to our sources, the group obtained names, addresses phone numbers of military and civilian personnel of all ranks. The agent had obtained intelligence about the location of buildings and hangars, identification of aircraft, frequency of flights and matters related to the routine use of the base. I have not been able to determine that this intelligence information was gathered as the result of simple or unaided personal observation or through third persons, nor whether he used specialized instruments for this purpose. I have to point out that the main objective was to obtain intelligence related to planes that use advanced electronic equipment for reconnaissance and bombing. The most famous plane of this type is the F-17 stealth fighter\bomber. Even though one of the members of the 10 was known to have had a non-specified assignment at the McGill Air Force Base in Tampa, the FBI has not revealed if this mission was linked to the Boca Chica operation. ( 4 )
The civilian targets have been identified as follows: Penetration of exile organizations to accomplish a campaign of disinformation, confusion, animosity and disunion among targeted groups. Another objective was to encourage and to facilitate the commission of hostile actions against Cuba in violation the Neutrality Act of the United States. Also, alleged was the sending of threatening letters to members of Congress impersonating members of Cuban exile organizations. It has not been reported that the 10 had committed any act of violence against the US, although there are documents that mention the preparation of terrorist acts against US Air Force bases in the US. ( 5 ) 


"ILLEGAL AGENTS"
In the FBI report, the 10 defendants are charged as "illegal agents." This is a serious violation of the US Penal Code. At the same time, some of them are being charged with illegal entry and exit from this country and conspiracy against the nation, another aggravating circumstance that is added to this judicial process. We have to clarify that in the judicial process of the United States, charges are presented one by one and the verdicts are judged individually. The jury that hears the case passes judgement of guilt or innocence on each charge presented by the prosecutor. The initial charge of not being registered as an agent of a foreign government is serious enough by itself to incarcerate the defendants. The denial of bail is sought mainly to prevent the accused from fleeing the country. (6 )
 
SCOPE OF THE ESPIONAGE NETWORK
The FBI has not published any information on the number of Cuban agents working in the US. In the case of the 10, the response of the agency is, "all those arrested are considered spies, but we have not arrested everybody that we suspect of being such." This answer is clear and consistent with the work of the Counterespionage Section of the Division of National Security of the FBI. In the world of counterespionage in this country, the practice usually is: to observe the suspicious activity suspected of being espionage, document the case and follow the movements. This observation of legal or "illegal" agents may last months or years. The FBI allows the "observed" to exit and reenter the country by legal or clandestine means. The main objective of the counterespionage agencies is to learn the methodology used, the objectives or targets of the activities and the reach or the scope of the penetration, not necessarily to incarcerate individual agents. "One spy in jail is of no use," remarked a source familiar with this practice. In the case of the 10, we are beginning to read the first of the many charges that will be presented to the court about this drama. Pro-Castro groups in this country will try to present this case as something without importance committed by a group of low-ranking spies who lacked resources but made up for that with revolutionary zeal. Of course, they will allege that the activities of the 10 were unknown to Fidel Castro. They may argue that Castro will punish those responsible for this adventure or "madness."
The extreme anti-Castro groups will present the case as a second Pearl Harbor, and will advocate a quick invasion of Cuba. Possibly, the advocates of these opposite groups have lost sight of what is at stake in this game. I will try to frame this coming debate within the juridical parameters of Washington. The situation at hand has to be judged, observed and analyzed by its range, scope, history and objectives to be obtained. And above all, considered within the political circumstances existing at this time between Washington and Havana.
It is difficult for the public to know the true extent of the Cuban espionage network. It will take many years to really know the number of Cuban illegal agents that the FBI has identified in the process. Many of them might actually be working as double agents, and others will continue being "observed" to monitor their movements and contacts. 

GENESIS OF CASTRO-CUBAN ESPIONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
The first serious attempt to "officialize" a Cuban intelligence network in the US, as far as I have been able to document, took place in September 1959. A Cuban intelligence officer named Comandante Abelardo Colome Ibarra, presented himself in the company of another Cuban now in exile, to the Section of Intelligence of the Sheriff of Dade County, Florida. He identified himself as a member of the department of intelligence of the rebel army (DIER). He offered an exchange of intelligence to that department. He proposed to provide intelligence on the activities of the mafia in Cuba in exchange for information about Cuban exiles in the US. The person who received this visitor on behalf of the Sheriff was an experienced multilingual specialist in intelligence affairs, 37 years old at the time. He responded to the visitor that he could not provide information about any person residing in the United States. This counterintelligence agent, now retired, is an astute person with professional knowledge of this "game." He was anticipating this visit.
"The intention of Colome Ibarra was to legitimize an espionage network that was already at work in Miami." This kind of trick is commonly used in the espionage business. Some people call it the "baptism." This is to give an apparent legal existence to something hidden or clandestine. The FBI and Florida state intelligence officers made a simple comment on the Cuban approach, translated as "come to tell the dancers how to dance."
The most important and effective espionage bosses in 40 years of activity in the United States working outside of embassies have been identified as General Julian Torres Rizo, and the twin brothers Antonio and Patricio de la Guardia Font. Also, worth mentioning was the recently deceased Manuel Piñero Losada (known as Red Beard) who directed from Cuba long-term espionage missions of penetration from the department of Americas of the Cuban Communist Party. The existence is known own as the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) in charge of foreign operations. Let's take the case of one of the arrested from the group of 10, Joseph Santos Cecilia (AKA: Mario), one of the persons assigned to help the one who was working inside the Boca Chica Air Force base. This agent was formerly a professor of engineering specializing in Computers and Telecommunications at the Central University of Santa Clara, Cuba. It is known that he received intensive specialized training prior to being assigned to this mission in the US. His wife, Amarylis Silverio (Julia), has a similar background in computers and telecommunications, and also was a professor of mathematics in the Department of Sciences at the university.
Sources in Santa Clara identify the couple as follows: Amarylis was born in the town of Placetas, near Santa Clara City in 1956. Joseph was born in the US in 1952, and he moved with his family to Cuba after the revolution. The couple met in Placetas. At the University, both were suspected of being active members of the MININT. Joseph speaks Spanish, English and Russian. He took engineering courses in the Soviet Union. In 1995 the couple left the city of Santa Clara, telling friends that they were going to take advanced courses at the University of Havana. The other members of the group of 10 have similar technical backgrounds.
 
ANALYSIS
The crisis and political scandal that surround President Clinton at this time means that the press is concentrated almost exclusively on the White House. However, a soon as the political climate of Washington is "normal" we are going to have a deep look by the press at this espionage case. After the elections in November, we have to anticipate that the members of the Congress will feel free to elaborate on the spy issue. The political debates about Cuba will be focused on the most significant aspects of this case of espionage, mainly the danger that the civilian population might face in the event of terrorism. I know that in this case there is tangential evidence that will raise again the 1996 shoot-down of the planes of the Brothers to the Rescue. In addition I expect that we will hear more of the failed plans to kidnap exiles General Rafael del Pino and Mayor Orestes Lorenzo.
The possible inclusion as co-conspirators of President Fidel Castro, General Abelardo Colome Ibarra and Jesus Bermudez Cutiño, will become a serious problem for the political aspirations of Vice President Al Gore and several candidates for elective office in the state of Florida. Let us remember that Florida is a key state in any national political campaign. Another item that will be debated will be the degree of cooperation between Cuban intelligence officers and members of the FBI and other federal agencies that watch the drug traffic in the Caribbean.
Recently, during a short visit to Miami a Cuban defector now residing in France, Colonel Dariel Alarcon Ramirez (Comandante Benigno), former guerilla fighter in Bolivia with Che Guevera, and member of the Cuban MININT, revealed in public what he had told me privately in an earlier conversation. He said that a group of Cuban intelligence agents headed by Enrique Gorriaran Merlo, (assassin of former Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza) came to Miami in 1975 with the mission to kill former CIA member Felix I. Rodriguez Mendigutia, because of Rodriguez's role in the 1967 capture of Che Guevara in Bolivia. Alarcon Ramirez defected to France in 1994, and is considered the highest- ranking defector from the Cuban intelligence services. It is possible that Alarcon Ramirez might be called on to provide background information or to testify in the case of the 10 and perhaps past activities of the MININT in the United States.
 
MOTIVES
To determine the motives behind the case of the 10 is one of the most difficult of tasks. What motivated Fidel Castro to order these actions? It is no secret that when Cuba started this plan of operations in 1995, Washington was inclined to normalize relations with Cuba as much as possible and on a continuing schedule. The Pentagon had cleared the way, saying that Cuba was no longer a military threat to the US. Recently, General John J. Sheehan (USMC- Retired), traveled to Cuba and had long hours of conversation with President Castro. At the end of the meeting, the General said that Castro was charming, and that Cuba represented no military threat to the United States. Obviously, the General can now be seen as ridiculed and humiliated by the same Cubans he praised. Below we present several theories that circulate in official Washington without subscribing to or discarding any of them.
1. Castro, knowing that his health is in an accelerated decline, wants to generate a big bang before he exits. 2.Castro, foreseeing a possible change of policy toward Cuba with the softening of the embargo, tries to radicalize Washington with this action. He acted in a similar way in 1975 when he perceived that President Carter sincerely tried to normalize relations with Cuba. His answer was a military intervention in Angola.
3.Castro was trying to get information to sell to a possible buyer; Russia, some radical Arab countries or Colombian drug dealers. 4.It is doubtful that Castro simply abandoned these spies to their fate on the grounds of inefficiency or for being double agents, as some have suggested. This end could have been achieved without publicity, expense and the scandal of an open provocation.
This is the first article of a series about this subject.
 
NOTES
1. List of suspects (also known as, AKA)
1.Manuel Viramontes, AKA: Giro, Giraldo 2.Luis Medina, AKA: Allan, Johnny, Oso 3.René González-Sehweret, AKA: Castor, Iselín 4.Antonio Guerrero, AKA: Rolando González-Díaz, Lorient 5.Rubén Campa, AKA: Vicky 6.Alejandro Alonso, AKA: Franklyn 7.Nilo Hernández, AKA: Manolo 8.Linda Hernández, AKA: Judith 9.Joseph Santos, AKA: Mario 10.Amarylis Silverio, AKA: Julia
The FBI warned that possibly some of the names of the suspects are false.
2. It is not a crime to be in possession of maps of cities, roads, etc. If the FBI included these maps as evidence, it is because there should be marks or notes on them on them that would incriminate the suspects. It should not be surprising that New York and Miami are areas with large populations of citizens of Cuban origin, however there is no apparent explanation for the inclusion of maps of Houston and Las Vegas. A possible explanation is that in these cities reside large populations of employees of nearby Air Force bases. Also, it is known that Las Vegas is an international center for money-laundering.
The Armed Forces Southern Command base is the location of a conglomerate of all the Pentagon services with headquarters in Miami and bases in different parts of Florida. The Southern Command is in charge, among other duties, of watching the drug traffic and military activities in the Caribbean, Central and South America. Formerly this command had its headquarters in Panama.
3. Actually, the majority of long distance communications are made through satellites. Cuba uses Russian satellites ("sputniks"). Telephones and transmission radios could be integrated into these satellites. It is known that the accused communicated mainly with Cuba through computer diskettes. The FBI has not revealed the details of sending and receiving diskettes. However, this agency has said that it is in the process of deciphering a large number of documents contained in these diskettes.
4. Among the documents confiscated from the 10 there is a clear indication that the objective of this mission was to obtain information on fighter and reconnaissance aircraft that use advanced electronics, known popularly as stealth aircraft. They cannot be detected by radar, and very little is known about them except that they are able silently bomb targets by unconventional means. These planes have an almost unlimited range, since they can be refueled in the air. The mother bases of this plane are not really known, but it is estimated that they are some place in the West or Midwest of the United states. It has not been revealed if stealth aircraft have used Southern Command bases. It is unknown to me if this type of aircraft is mentioned in the confiscated documents, but the documents do include mention of aircraft for similar missions. However, these bases have been used by AWACS aircraft, which play a major role in surveillance and drug-interdiction missions.
5. Attorneys we have consulted about this case are of the opinion that the obstruction of civic groups or any peaceful organization from expressing an opinion might not be a grave offense in legal terms. However, to encourage, contribute, facilitate and participate in a violation of the Neutrality Act is a serious felony, since it constitutes a premeditated and implemented conspiracy sponsored by a foreign government. Legally, a conspiracy is when two or more people associate or gather with the intention to violate the law and take the first steps to do so. This crime might carry several years of jail for the participants. In the case of threatening letters to members of the US Congress impersonating or pretending to be an organized group of Cuban exiles consists of a felony perhaps penalized by years of jail time.
However, the most serious of the charges is to plan to commit acts of sabotage or terrorism against US military installations or bases following orders of a foreign government. In some cases, this might be an act of war and could be classified as state-sponsored terrorism. Cuba is already on the list of states that sponsor terrorism. The United States will have to determine how to address this conspiracy to commit terrorist acts within a political and judicial framework. Prosecutors will have to decide whether to include the head of government in Cuba and his subordinate, in this case the Minister of the Interior Abelardo Colome Ibarra and ask the court to judge them in absentia. In this case, the prosecutor will act on behalf of Attorney General Janet Reno and will make the decision after consulting with her. He has to implement this decision. It will be up to President Clinton and his advisors to make this political decision to include the head of another state as a defendant.
6. US law states that any person who represents the interests of a foreign government to work legally in this country has to be registered as such, either in the diplomatic list or the foreign agents registry. It is not a crime to obtain information or intelligence by legal means if you do not violate the laws of this country.
A person commits espionage when he is in possession of, or tries to obtain by illegal means secret information on the country in which he is residing. Those agents that work on behalf of a foreign government and do not appear registered as a foreign agent are considered "illegal," or spies. In the case of the "10" three of them appear to be illegals on two grounds: First, they were engaged in illegal activities and second, they entered the country by clandestine means.
 S:jonathanpollard.org

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